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U An investment strategy encompasses a sequence of tac-
tical investment projects, of which several may yield a low
relum when considered in i.solation. Often the value of
such an investment consists ofthe option to invest in the
future growth of the finn. Eor example, the value of a pilot
project or an R&D investment does not derive so much
from the expecied cash inflows., but rather from the option
to invest in future commercial exploitation. Standard fore-
casting of the expected cash inllows implicitly assumes
investing in the follow-up project. Therefore, the tradi-
tional discounted cash flow (DCE) method has serious
shortcomings in analyzing projects when infonnation con-
cernini; future investment decisions is not yet known. The
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application of option theory can be used as an analytical
tool to evaluate such projects and to support the overall
operating and investment strategy. Brennan and Schwartz
111 examine the operational policy of a copper mine. Myers
19], Trigeorgis [12], McDonald und Siegel [8|. Majd and
Pindyck [101, and Myers and Majd [10] provide other
examples of flexible investmenl strategies.
We consider the option to defer investment in pro-
duction facilities analogous to a call option on a
dividend-pay ing stock. In this investment strategy, deci-
sions involving the creation of capacity may be ptistponed
so that management can decide not to invest if market
demand turns out to be unfavorable. On the other hand-
deferral also has disadvantages since during the postpone-
ment period the firm misses tiie net operating cash inflows.
The analogy with a call option, of course, is not exact. One
difference between financial caii options and future invest-
ment possibilities is the exclusiveness ofthe latter. Kester
[5] andTrigeorgis[12| have shown that competition in the
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market may force the company to invest early, whicb may
erode the flexibility value of a deferred investment
strategy.
Tbis paper casts the real options approach for project
liming in a microeconomic framework. We use microeco-
nomic tools to analyze aspects of competition in the invest-
ment strategy in forecasting tbe cash infiows. In this con-
nection, we focus particularly on the concept of economic
rents, i.e.. the excess profit above the opportunity cost of
capital. Economic rents attract new entrants to the market
so that if the investment opportunity is not exclusive new
entrants will diminish retums until expected and required
retums are equal. Under rivalry, economic rents only exist
if the firm has a specific competitive advantage in the
realization of the project. The finn, therefore, needs to
identify those markets in which it has a temporary or
permanent competitive advantage and concentrate invest-
ment in these areas. If tbe competitive advantage is tem-
porary, expected economic rents will decline over titne and
postponement will erode the value of tbe project. Based on
the finn's strength in relation to its competitors and the
value of the project in relation to market uncertainty, we
develop various investment tactics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses
the options approach to investment timing. Section II
studies the concept of economic rents for strategic plan-
ning purposes, as well as the influence of competition on
the expected economic rents over time. In Section III, we
use an options approach for titning investment strategy in
different microeconotnic market contexts. Einally, Section
IV provides some concluding remarks and directions for
further research.
I. The Option to Defer Investment
Some investment projects can actually be seen as the
first links in a chain of subsequent investment decisions.
Witb projects of this type, tbe firm essentially acquires an
option to invest in a potential follow-up project. For exam-
ple, an R&D project, the development of a new technology,
or entry into a new geographical market may create future
investment opportunities. In strategy, these projects are
often compared witb options for future company growtb
(e.g.. see Myers [9J). We consider the option to defer a
project (see Kester \5] for a qualitative approacb. and
Trigeorgis [12] or Kemna and Vorst [4J for a quantitative
treatment). The deferment of a capacity expansion pro-
gram caused by uncertain market demand i.s seen to create
flexibility for management. The titning of investment in a
Exhibit 1. Analogy of a Deferred Project With a Call
Option
production facility is analogous to the timing of exercising
of a call option on a dividend-paying stock.
Exhibit 1 illustrates this analogy. The utiderlying value
is the present value of tbe net operating casb inflows, Vf.
Tbe (present value of tbe) investment outlay in the plant,
/. is equivalent to the exercise price. If. in time, market
demand develops favorably, the firm would invest imd the
net value of tbe project would equal its A'PV^ V,-/. If the
project does not prove to be lucrative and the net present
value tums out to be negative, management tnay decide
not to invest and the value is zero. Besides this advantage
to wait and see, deferment also has disadvantages. For
example, if we consider a project witb an infinite life,
management misses the net operating casb inflows when
the plant is not operative. The rnissed net operating cash
inflow during the defennent period is equivalent to a
dividend.
Based on this analogy, we can use option valuation
techniques to value a deferred project atid support the
investment strategy. The binomial option valuation
metbod of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [2] is a useful tool
in this regard. We subsequently express the missed cash
inflow during the postponement pericxl as a constant pro-
portion of the state project value. The dynamics of market
demand for the product result in a series of possible project
values, V,.(, in eacb state (s) over time (/). The investment
timing problem is solved recursively, starting witb future
values and working backward. The investment opportunity
value is equal to the maximum of Vf_, - / wben manage-
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ment invests, zero when management decides not to invest,
and the option value when management defers the project.
The essence of the investmeni timing strategy is to find for
every decision moment a critical project value V*. At this
critical value, the missed net operating cash inflow equals
the llexibility value from postponing one more period. As
long as the value of the project is below this critical value,
the project will be deferred. Should the project value
exceed the critical value, management would invest.
In asset valuation, we create shareholders' value by
investing in projects for which the financial market value
(of the cash inflows) exceeds the investment outlays.
Therefore, we try to determine what the project would be
worth if it were traded in a fmancial market. Option
valuation models are often based on arbitrage arguments
with an option equivalent. An equivalent portfolio strategy,
consisting of a position in the underiying asset partly
financed with a risk-free loan, is constructed so that it has
in every state the same payoff as the option, and should
therefore have the same value. In the real options case, the
financial markei valuation of the postponed project is
determined by a project equivalent in the financial market.
We could justify the portfolio equivalent approach if a
financial instrument is traded with exactly the same risk
characteristics as the project. If the underiying state vari-
able is taken to be the price of a commodity, for example,
an equivalent portfolio could be constructed with futures
in the commodity (e.g.. see Brennan and Schwartz [ I ] for
the valuation of a copper mine). In the case of postponing
a plant for consumer products, however, the underlying
asset is an aggregate variable. If an identical plant is not
explicitly traded, application of the option valuation
method seems questionable. However, if the financial mar-
kets are complete, in that the securities traded are sufficient
for dynamic spanning ofthe underlying asset, the option
valuation method can still be applied (see Mason and
Merton [7]). In complete financial markets, there would
exist portfolios of securities that replicate the dynamics of
the present value ofthe project caused by the rate of change
of prices and market demand.
As noted, the analogy between a call option and a
deferred project is not exact. A major difference is the
degree of exclusiveness uf the latter, so the cail option
analogy must be seen in the context of market structure
(e.g.. see Kester [5] and Trigeorgis [12]). A project in a
monopoly situation is more analogous to a call option,
since it involves an exclusive right to invest. A project
under perfect competition, on the other hand, is like a
"public good" of the whole industry. In this case, there is
a loss in value from postponement caused by the entry of
competitors. Emerging competition or rivalry may thus
create an incentive to invest early, as postponement ofthe
project may result in project value erosion. This is par-
ticularly so if early investment would preempt competitive
entry (e.g., Kester |5], Trigeorgis 113]).
II. Corporate Strategy and Economic
Rents
In an efficient fmancial market, the prices of all traded
securities adjust rapidly to reflect all currently available
information. If information about a firni's profits or new
projects arrives in the financial market, investors bid up the
prices until the retum equals that on investments with
comparable risk. Real markets are often less than perfectly
competitive, so it is possible for a fimi to consistently eam
excess returns that exceed the opportunity cost of capital
(see Shapiro 1111). We estimate the expected net operating
cash inflow as the opportunity cost of capital plus the
expected economic rent:
/ = 1,2.3. (1}
CF, = the expected net operating cash inflow.
/ = Ihe investmeni cash outflow.
/ = the opportutiily cost of capilal.
ER, = the expected economic rent.
In Equation (1), {f)i reflects the yearly opportunity cost of
capital invested in a project with an infinite life.
Various microeconomic models can help in forecasting
the excess economic rents or expected profit. In a competi-
tive market characterized by costless entry and exit and
homogeneous products, an eariy investment can produce
only temporary economic rents. The expected economic
rents can have several sources; for example, they can result
from a new product introduction. Eventually, however,
potential competitors will catch up and enter the industry.
When the industry settles into long-run competitive equi-
librium, all projects are expected to just eam their oppor-
tunity cost of capital and their expected net present value
will just be zero. Economic rents are not always temporary.
If, for example, the fimi has a proprietary technology
protected by enforceable patents, the economic rents could
be persistent. As long as barriers to entry remain, the fum
has an exclusive or proprietary investment opportunity.
Appendix A describes the modelling of economic rents
under perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly.
Under rivalry, economic rents would exist if the firm
has a competitive advantage in realizing the project. Bar-
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riers to entry or a distinct competitive advantage over
existing competitors (e.g.. economies of scale and scope,
absolute cost advantages or product differentiation) are the
real source of economic rents. Tlie finn therefore needs to
identify those markets in which it has a temporary or
permanent competitive advantage, and concentrate invest-
ment in these areas. Understanding potential barriers to
entry helps identify these markets and potential value-
creating investment opportunities. One strategy, for exam-
ple, will be directed towards increasing volume because of
economies of scale or broadening when economies of
scope are important in the market (see Hall [3]).
The present value of a project with an infinite life and
constant expected^ cash inflows, when the cost of
capital is /. equals V,=_CF, / / . At the^nd of the period, the
present value equals V'/"' ^ (1 + i){CF, / / ) . The difference
between these present values reflects the net operating
cash inflow during the deferment period. CF,,. We sub-
sequently express this cash inflow as a proportion of ihe
state project value in the binomial option model, b,^Mf'
so the present value. V, j , of the project equals
(1 -^t.s)^u- Since there is no decline in expected eco-
nomic rent and expected cash inflow under monopoly, a
postponed project in monopoly is analogous to a call
option on a stock with a constant dividend payout
ratio, 6,,,^ .:
Exhibit 2. Simultaneous Investment Subgame
( 1 + 0 ' r=1.2, 3. (2)
Under perfect competition, the expected net operational
cash inflows will change over time until the project earns
just the opportunity cost of capital.' The deferred project
under perfect competition is thus analogous to a call option
on stock with a changing dividend payout ratio:
, f -1 .2 .3 .
(3)
In Equation (3), (/)/ reflects the yearly opportunity cost
of capital, while j l - ( | / { | + / ) ) e - ^ | jvf«<-(i+/)/[ re-
flects Ihe economic rent in each state of nature. Note that
when the industry settles into competitive long-run equi-
librium, the net present value of the project becomes zero
Assuming lhat an individual competitor does nol lake the value of
waiting inio account.
FlrmB
Inveia Defer
Firm A
Defer
1
Vi — 1 V< — i
III
11
V I E — 1 Ci
IV
-I- /) = I), and 5,^ v equals //(] + /) as with constant
expected cash inflows. If the projects have a positive net
present value, competitors will enter and 5/ ^ > i/{\ + /}. If
instead projects have negative net present values, com-
petitors will exit and 6,_^ . < //(1 + ().
The number of firms active in an industry characterizes
the intensity of competition. In monopoly, only one t'lnn
operates in the market, whereas in perfect competition, the
number of firms is very large. Oligopoly is between these
two extremes. In the case of duopoly, two linns aiv oper-
ating so that the behavior of each individual competitor
directly influences the value of the project. The investment
timing strategy of an incumbent firm in duopoly is coupled
to the timing tactics of the rival. In the case of an early
investment, it is sometimes possible to avoid a decrease in
value by preempting the competitor. The threat of preemp-
tion is primarily determined by the strength of the linn and
the intensity of competition in the industry (e.g., see Tirole
[14]).
Applying basic principles from game theory, we can
develop different investment tactics under each market
structure. In duopoly, the timing of a project will be
influenced by the development of market demand and the
bebavior of the competitor. Instead of the maximum of
{Vf,,( - /, 0) and the deferment value in the binomial option
model, the state value would now be equal lo the (Nash
equilibrium) outcome of a simultaneous investment sub-
game. Exhibit 2 presents an example of thi.s subgame in
the normal form (see Exhibit 6 for the option pricing model
in extensive form). There are four jrossible situalions: [i)
both finn A and firm B decide to invest; (//) A decides to
invest but B waits; (///) A waits but B invests; and {iv) both
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A and B wait. The first number in each cell indicates the
investment opptirtunity value for firm A. while the second
number is the value of a competing project of firm B. The
investment opportunity net value is estimated as the net
present value, V/,v - L for a direct investment, or the option
value, C, (, for a postponed investment. Note that each
value depends on the tactic of the other firm (wait or
invest), particularly if an early investment preempts a
competitor or leads to a cost advantage;
III. Investment Timing Strategy and
Economic Rents
A crucial strategic choice for competing in emerging
industries is the timing of investment in capacity. We next
utilize a simple numerical example to illustrate the timing
strategy, first under perfect competition, and then under
monopoly. The firm in this example has invested in a pilot
project to get an early foothold in ihc market. If the market
opens up and creates expansion opportunities, the firm will
increase capacity significantly by investing in a follow-up
project. This pioneering strategy involves high risk, but
also involves low competition in the early stage of the
market leading to substantial expected economic rents.
Here we assume:
(/) An industry portfolio is traded in the financial
market with exactly tbe same risk characteristics
as the project, yielding an expected retum of 16%.
The dynamics in the present value of the follow-up
project imply a 25% increase {ti = 1.25) or a 20%
decline {d = 0.8) per year. This represents a stan-
dard deviation in project present value of 22.315%
per year. The real rate of interest is five percent per
year{/-= 1.05).
(/() The expected economic rent of the follow-up proj-
ect in the first year is 10. Due to anticipated entry,
the cash inflows will decline exponentially at a
30% annual rate until the project earns the oppor-
tunity cost of capital of 16%.
(//•/) The production facility has an infinite physical life.
The required investment outlay is 500.
Given the declining expected economic rents and the
opportunity cost of capital of 16%. the present value of the
expected operating cash intlows from the production facil-
ities is estimated to be 524.- The net present value (NPV)
therefore is 524 - 500 = 24. Based on the net present value
rule, management should invest immediately.
However, when we consider the option to defer capacity
expansion and wait to see how the market develops further,
management should postpone. The dynamics of market
demand for the product result in a series of possible project
values over time. Based on the binomial option pricing
model, the value of the deferred project may increase by a
factor of M( 1 - 6,,^ ) per period if market demand tums out
to be favorable, or it may decrease by a factor of
(/(! -S/j) per period if market demand tums out to be
unfavorable, i.e..
524 - - ^
defer (28) -~^
548 ,--^^
^^.^^^ invest (48) -
^ - ^ 397 --——
defer (7) ---..,_
567
^,,-* invest (67)
409
~~ * defer(7)
447
^ defer (10)
^~-~--* 332
defer (5)
The net value (inside the parentheses) at each state is equal
to the maximum of;
V,,v-/ invest
Cr 1 = ^ —— ' ~ defer
where p = -: is the risk-neutral probability.^
The value of the option to invest in the follow-up project
is 28. which is greater than the net present value of 24. The
optimal strategy, therefore, is to defer the follow-up project
until the market develops favorably.
If we consider a project with the same economic rent,
FR\, in a monopoly, the expected net operating cash in-
flows are constant. The present value of the production
facilities is now 563. and the NPV equals 563 - 500 = 63.
When we consider the option to defer capacity expansion,
management should invest immediately;
^524 = 10 + 0.16(500) ^ 7.4 + 0.16(500) ^ 5.5+0.16(.'S0())
1.16 (1.16)^ (1.16)^
0 + 0.16(500)
(1.16)"
V is the probability tliat would prevail if investors were risk-neutral. This
valualion principle is based on arbitrage arguments with a replicating
portfolio.
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Exhibit 3. Investment Timing Strategy Under Perfect Competition and Monopoly
perfect competition monopoly
present value of
the follow-up
project (V)
present value of
the follow-up
project
V.
time
V*
time
563
invest (63)
606
invest (106)
388
defer (3)
653
invest (153)
418
defer(5)
268
defer (0)
Exhibit 3 illustrates how the dynamics in present valtie,
V,, and the critical value above which it becomes optimal
to invest, V^, relate to each other. In the case in which the
firm shares the investment opportunity with competitors,
atiticipated entry causes a decline in ihe expected present
value of the project. V,, and a low critical value, V^. The
absence of a structural competitive advantage may result
in a tendency to invest early to preclude erosion in the value
ofthe project. The figure on the righthand side of Exhibit
3 shows how the dynamics in present value and the critical
value relate to each other in the case of an exclusive
investment opportunity. Under monopoly, postponement
of the project does not necessarily imply a decrease in
expected value. Assuming the project has an infinite life,
the critical value would be constanl over titne. In cotnpari-
.son to perfect competition, there is a stronger tendency to
postpone projects under monopoly with relatively low net
present values. However, if the project has a relatively high
NPV due to pennanent economic rents, there would be an
incentive to invest early.
Now consider the timing of the follow-up project in a
duopoly market. The expected net operating cash inflows
are constant until a competitor invests in a competing
project. However, in the case of an early investment, it is
sometimes possible to avoid a decrease in value by pre-
etnpt ing the markel. Instead ofthe maximumof(VVv-/. 0)
or the deferment value in the binomial option model, the
state value would now equal the (subgame perfect equilib-
rium) outcome of a simultaneous investment subgame.
Consider an example with two identical fimis pursuing
similar tactics for investment in the follow-up project."*
Exhibit 4 illustrates the net values of a two-period game in
extensive form. The actions to invest {/) or defer (D) are
reflected by the branches. When both firms A and B invest,
the game ends; when both firms defer, nature (iV) moves
and the game is repeated: and when one firm invests first.
nature moves and the follower may then decide to invest
later. The strategy of each fimi consists of mapping Ihe
information set about the competitor's actions and the
development of market demand {N moves) to an action by
the firm. The subgame perfect equilibrium set of strategies
can be found by backward induction, starting from the
future project values for both firms and working back
along the tree. The bold branches along the tree reflect the
optimal actions along the equilibrium path. In this exam-
'^ In Ihe symmetrical duopoly example, we use u = 1.5. ci = 0.66. r= 1,1.
p = 0.52. e = 0.55. V = 0.5, K(, = 100. and / = 50. The values in Exhibit 4
are rounded and ba.sed tm more periods.
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Exhibit 4. Project Value Outcomes of a Gatne in Extensive Form When Two Competitors Have Symmetrical Market
Power
pie. both firms have an identical strategy, i.e.. deferring (D)
the follow-up project and investing (/) if. in the early stage,
market demand turns out to be favorable (i.e., /V moves up);
or deferring the project further if market demand turns out
to be unfavorable (i.e.. A' moves down) and continuing
deferment in the later stage ofthe market (N moves down,
up or down, down),
Consider next the subgame following initial deferral
(D) by both firms and favorable demand {N moves up) in
which both firms follow a strategy to defer (D) and market
demand turns out to be favorable (A' moves up). In this
case a decision to invest has a higher net value for the
follow-up project, compared to deferral, regardless of
whether the competitor decides to invest or not (34 > 25
and 42 > 30). Both firms have a strictly dominant strategy
to invest, resulting in net present values of (34,34) for both
follow-up projects. If the niitrket develops unfavorably in
the last stage {N moves down), the dominant strategy for
both tlrms is to defer, leading to (3, 3) values. Calculating
the state values recursively along the nodes results in
(17, 17) option values of the investment opportunities
when both defer {D) in the earlier stage of the market.-^  Tlie
- 1 7 .
dilemma of this subgame (A, B defer, A' moves up) is
known as the prisoner's dilemma. Firm A's dominant strat-
egy is to invest whether the competitor decides to invest or
not. The dominant strategy for firm B is also to invest
immediately (15 > 13 and 21 > 17). Thus, both firms will
choose to invest. The paradox is that the outcome {15, 15)
is worse for both, compared with the situation when both
defer (17,17). If both firms coordinated their investtnent
strategies, they would be better off in the latter situation.
If market demand develops favorably (N moves up), both
firms would invest and the NPV of the projects are (15,
15), whereas, if the market develops unfavorably {N moves
down), both firms would defer and the option values of the
investment opportunities are (1, 1). Using these outcomes
in the backward valuation process results in (8, 8) option
values for the investment opportunities when both firms
defer in the first slage.
In the previous example, we assumed identical tactics
and equal market power for the two competitors. Of
course, the strengths of each firm in an industry are not
always identical. Subsequently, we focus on the influence
of asymmetrical market power on a finn's investment
tactics. A dominant position in the industry may give a
competitive advantage to the finn in the realization of
project value. Consider, for example, the case where back-
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Exhibit 5. Project Value Outcotnes of a Game in Extensive Form When Two Competitors Have Asymmetrical Market
Power
ward induction leads to the asymmetrical game between a
dominant and a weak firm shown in Exhibit 5.^
When both firm.s deter in the early stage (D) and markel
demand develops favorably (A' moves up), the compelilive
advantage of firm A resuUs in a higher net present value
from immediately investing in the project and a lower
vaiue of waiting. Thus, for firm A. the dominant strategy
is to invest early, irrespective ofthe strategy of competitor
B (15 > 13 and 21 > 18). Because u comparable project
will have a lower value for the weaker competitor, the
competitor will not invest first. Knowing that firm A will
invest, the dominant strategy for firm B is to defer (7 > 2).
In this example, the two firms pursue different strategies.
Dominant firm A itivests and preempts the market (receiv-
ing 21) if, in the early stage, market demand tums out to
be favorable, or further defers if market demand tums out
to be unfavorable. The preferred strategy for the weak firm
is in each case to defer the project, waiting until the market
develops sufficiently before entering with its project.
In general, market power can influence the threat of
preemption. Typically, projects with low prcsetit value
from immediate investment would be postponed. The low
project value of weaker competitors gives them little abil-
ity to preempt a stronger competitor with high project
'In the asymmetrical duopoly exampie, we use the same input variables
as in Ihe symmetricai game, except Ibr the present value ofthe investtnent
opportunity of the weak firm B. For firm B's project, we use V,, = 80 and
/ = 50 instead.
value. The market power of a firm may also influence the
value erosion associated with preemption of a competitor.
By investing early, a weak competitor may only gain a
small share ofthe total market, but the potential loss in the
value of the project would be minimal. The loss in value,
if the finn becomes a followei, will be larger as the tnarket
power of the leader grows, because then an early invest-
ment can take significant market share away.
Based on the rnarket strength ofa firm in relation to its
competitors and the value of the project in relation to
market uncertainty, we can distiriguish the following in-
vestment tactics:
(/) Projects with relatively small net present values
from immediate investment in uncertain markets
have relatively larger decision flexibility value
favoring postponement. If the fimi has a dominant
position in the industry, there is little threat of
complete preemption by competitors. The firm can
safely postpone the project, and invest only if the
market develops favorably or if the weaker com-
petitor invests first. It is even possible that a dom-
inant firm can delay investing even when a weaker
competitor invests. This could be the case if the
competitor can test the market without taking away
a significant market share.
(//) Projects with relatively large net present values in
stable market environments have rchitively small
flexibility values. The opportunity cost of defer-
ment in the form of missed cash inflows during the
SMIT & ANKUM / A REAL OPTIONS AND GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH 249
deferment period i.s high, and so the dominant firm
{linn A in the previous example) will inve.st early.
(///) If the finn has a weak position in the market and
the project does not have a large net present value,
it may be better to wait until the market develops
sufficiently in the future to start tlie project (finn
B in the previous example).
(iv) If the firm has a weak market position but the
project appears to have a positive net present value,
it would invest immediately if early investment can
preempt a competitor or create a cost advantage.
Ht>wever, because of the weak position of the
company, a stronger competitor may come in and
erode its net present value (even turn it negative).
IV. Conclusions
The net present value (NPV) method has serious short-
comings in analyzing projects when future decisions are
contingent on intermediate developments in an uncertain
environment. Option theory provides a better analytical
lool to evaluate such projects. One important difference
between a real investment opportunity and a call option is
the exclusiveness ofthe latter. If we u.se the analogy with
a call option to value an investment opportunity, we have
to take this difference into account.
Using simple numerical examples, we have illustrated
the intluence of competition on project value and invest-
ment timing. Postponement under perfect competition im-
plies a loss in the expected value of the project due to
anticipated competitive entry. Absence of a structural com-
petitive advantage may thus result in a tendency to invest
early if the firm can preclude this erosion of value. An
investment opportunity in a monopoly is exclusive, so
during the postpotienient period there is no expected loss
in value due to competition. In comparison with perfect
competition, there i.s a stronger tendency under monopoly
to postpone projects with relatively low net present values.
On the other hand, an exclusive project with large present
value creates a tendency to invest early.
01 igopoly lies between these two extremes. Here, a few
ilmis are operating in the industry with individual market
power. In duopoly, il may be attractive for both firms to
defer investment when there is low project value and
uncertain market demand. If the firms can coordinate their
investment, both will postpone. However, as soon as one
ofthe finns invests, the other firm will follow suit with a
similar project. If competitive rivalry is intense and there
is no coordination, both firms will invest immediately,
which ma) be suboptitnal. In the case where t1mis in the
industry have asymmetric market power, we have distin-
guished various investment tactics based on the firm's
strength in relation to its competitors, and the net present
value from immediate investment in relation to market
uncertainty.
In general, a firm will postpone projects when net
present value is low, market demand is uncertain, and
interest rates are high. In contrast to a financial option, the
degree of nonexclusiveness of the investment opportunity
influences the investment strategy. When there are many
competitors, each with a negligible market power, antici-
pated entry can erode the value ofthe project. With a few
competitors having individual market power, there may be
a threat of complete preemption. Future research can be
directed toward applying the option valuation approach in
real cases. Extension of the theory can be directed toward
modelling option pricing in combination with dynamic
game theory and incomplete infomiation. However, with
higher mathematical complexity, much ofthe intuition of
viewing projects as real options may be sacrificed.
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Appendix A. Forecasting Cash Inflows
in Different Market Structures
This appendix relates cash inflows to economic rents.
We estimate the expected net operating cash inflow as the
opportunity cost of capital plus the expected economic
rent, according to Equation (1). We assume that (/) the
fmancial market is efficient; and (/() the project has an
infinite physical life.
I. Perfect Competition
In perfect competition, economic rents are expected to
decline exponentially, as follows:
ER, = - < / ' t= 1.2.3, (A!)
II. Monopoly
In monopoly, the expected economic rents are constant.
lil. Duopoly
In oligopoly, the timing of a project will be influenced
by the behavior of a competitor. Instead of the maximum
of (S^t.s " !' 0) 2nd the defeniient value in the original
version of the binomial model, a state value equals the
outcome of a simultaneous subgame. The investment tim-
ing problem is then solved by backward induction leading
to a subgame perfect equilibrium. The details are shown in
Exhibit 6.
- present value of operating cash inflows as if
there is no competitioti.
9 =
V =
proportion of value left when the firm
preempts the market.
proporlion of value left when both firms
itivest simultaneously.
6, - proportion of value expressing net operating
cash ititlow.
p = risk-neutral probability.
t= 1.2.3. {A2)
Exhibit 6. The Game in Extensive Form


